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Considered by Oxberger, C.J., and Donielson and Habhab,
JJ.

HABHAB, J.

This case concerns an appeal from a termination proceeding involving two children, R.W. (born August 2, 1984) and J.W. (born June 7, 1983). The children have the same biological mother, S.C., and different biological fathers. T.V. is the father of R.W.; R.L.W. is the father of J.W.

The juvenile court terminated T.V.'s and S.C.'s parental rights to R.W. It also terminated S.C.'s parental rights to J.W., but dismissed the State's petition as against R.L.W. The mother, S.C., and one child, J.W., by and through her guardian ad litem, appeal the juvenile court's decision. The mother argues the trial court erred in finding that her children are likely to suffer future harm or neglect if returned to her home. As to the mother's claim, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

The child, J.W., also appeals the decision of the juvenile court. She asserts the court erred in dismissing the State's petition against R.L.W. We agree. To support her position, she argues there was clear and convincing evidence that she should not be returned to her father because he did not comply with reunification plans proposed by the Department of Human Services. We again agree. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the juvenile court in this regard only.

Appellate review of proceedings to terminate a parent-child relationship is de novo--the reviewing court may review the facts as well as the law and adjudicate the parents' rights anew. In Interest of Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981). However, weight is to be accorded the findings of the juvenile court, particularly as regards the credibility of witnesses. Id.

Central to a determination of this nature are the best interests of the child. Dameron, 306 N.W.2d at 745. Those best interest are to be determined by looking at the child's long-range as well as immediate interests. Id. The court is to consider what the future likely holds for the child if that child is returned to his or her parents. Id. Insight of that determination is to be gained from evidence of the parents' past performance, for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that the parent is capable of providing. Id. Case history records are entitled to much probative force when a parent's record is being examined. Harter v. State, 149 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1967).

The Iowa Supreme Court has often recognized "that there exists a parental interest in the integrity of the family unit; nonetheless we also are cognizant that this interest is not absolute, but rather may be forfeited by certain parental conduct." Dameron, 306 N.W.2d at 745. The State has the duty to see that every child within its borders

receives proper care and treatment and must intercede when parents abdicate that responsibility. Id. The termination statutes are preventative as well as remedial. Id. Under those statutes, the State must act to prevent probable harm to a child and need not delay until harm has actually occurred. Id.

Termination may occur under the statute where there is clear and convincing evidence that the child has been in foster care for twelve months and would probably suffer harm if returned home. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e) (1989); In re Interest of Chad, 318 N.W.2d 213 (Iowa 1982). The child should not be forced to endlessly suffer the parentless limbo of foster care. Long v. Long, 255 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Iowa 1977). He or she need not endlessly await the maturity of his or her natural parent. In Interest of T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Iowa 1983). Termination must occur if enough time (twelve to eighteen months) has passed and the parent still cannot take care of the child. Id.

The recent case of In Interest of A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1988), states that the requirement of Iowa Code section 232.116(5)(c) (now see Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(3) (Supp. 1987)) "is met when the child cannot be returned to the parental home because the definitional grounds of a child in need of assistance, Iowa Code § 232.2(6), exist." Id. at 725. If any one of the grounds listed in Iowa Code section 232.2(6) can be proven by clear and convincing

evidence, there is a sufficient basis for the termination. Id. It is not necessary that the original grounds for the adjudication be found to still exist. Id.

I.

The mother, S.C., argues she is capable of caring for the needs of her children. She contends the record does not support the fact that the children will be neglected or harmed if they are returned to her custody. We disagree.

S.C. suffers from organic personality syndrome and is mildly retarded. Her condition is permanent and cannot be alleviated by medication. As a result of this condition, S.C. suffers from mood swings, outbursts of temper, and impaired judgment. She also has difficulty remembering.

Termination is appropriate when the disabled parent lacks the capacity to meet the child's present needs as well as the capacity to adapt to the child's future needs. In the Interest of A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 734 (Iowa 1988). Mental disability alone is not a sufficient reason for the termination of the parent-child relationship but it is a contributing factor to the inability to perform the duties of a parent. In re Wardle, 207 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Iowa 1973).

S.C.'s parenting skills are severely underdeveloped. She has been described as a child herself; she has marked difficulties leading her own children. S.C. was unable to follow through with departmental recommendations: She

could not maintain a stable residence; since March of 1987 she has moved nine times; she has had several live-in boyfriends; S.C. did not successfully complete her parenting class and showed no improvement in these skills. Generally, she has made little progress since the initial departmental involvement with her case in 1983.

S.C. has become romantically involved with men who are either physically or emotionally abusive to her or her children. J.W. was observed to be a very frightened and reclusive child when she first was admitted to foster care. R.W., father of J.W., has disciplined children inappropriately in the past by holding an open flame of a lighter under their hand. Another child of hers has been hospitalized and placed in foster care because he suffered from baby shake syndrome, inflicted by one of her boyfriends.

S.C.'s multiple romantic liaisons and the lack of judgment such action represents are a very real threat to the safety and emotional health of her children.

She lastly contends the opinion of an examining psychiatrist is deficient in that he was prejudiced, his contact with her was minimal, and his opinions were based on reports not of his own making. A review of the record discloses no objection was made concerning this issue at the time of the doctor's testimony. We, therefore, decline to consider an issue not properly preserved for appeal.

Additionally, no authority was cited by the appellant in support of this argument. It is thereby waived. Iowa R. App. P. 14(a)(3).

For the above reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's decision terminating S.C.'s parental rights.

II.

A review of the record discloses the fact that R.L.W. (father of J.W.) does not have a sincere desire, as manifested by his past actions, to provide a stable, nurturing environment in which J.W. can grow. Because of this attitude, J.W. is likely to suffer harm.

J.W.'s parents were married on September 27, 1982, and separated two weeks later. J.W. was born the following June. R.L.W. did not acknowledge J.W. as his child until blood tests were taken to establish paternity. Conspicuously, after paternity was identified, J.L.W. made no attempt to visit J.W. The first visit was made when the child was three years old. In addition, he has not voluntarily contributed to her financial support.

R.L.W. presently resides with a woman named Arlene. The record reflects a stormy history between the two, replete with arguments and physical violence. They have one child. Another child resides with them. This child is the offspring of Arlene and T.V. T.V. is the father of R.W.

R.L.W. was ordered by the district court to "attend and cooperate" in parenting classes. The teacher of the parenting classes stated that R.L.W. did not participate in any discussions or assignments and often disrupted the class by his antagonistic attitude. Further, R.L.W. was directed to locate stable housing. He failed to do so. Between 1986 and 1987, R.L.W. moved six times. He was also required to procure individual counseling. He did not complete this requirement either.¹

Finally, the record reflects that J.W. has a strong attachment to her half-brother, R.W., and their interdependence. For this reason, we find it to be in her best interests not to separate the two children. Expert testimony was received as to the detrimental effect such a separation could cause.

"There exists a parental interest in the integrity of the family unit; nonetheless we also are cognizant that this interest is not absolute, but rather may be forfeited by certain parental conduct." Dameron, 306 N.W.2d at 745. We believe that J.L.W. gave up his parental interest in keeping his family whole. He has exhibited little interest in learning how to parent. Not until the termination proceedings were commenced did J.L.W. make any request to be a placement option for J.W. He repeatedly acquiesced to

1. R.L.W. did attend family counseling with Arlene. However, the focus of this therapy was on their relationship, not upon his own difficulties as so ordered.

foster care placement for J.W. His eleventh hour desire to not forfeit his parental rights is unconvincing. He has made no attempt to provide a stable, emotional and physical environment in which J.W. could grow.

As stated in the juvenile court's opinion: "[W]e cannot condone his lack of interest in visiting his child that occurred during the early parts of 1988 nor is the court thoroughly convinced of the [sincerity] that [R.W.] has in retaining custody of his daughter." We do find clear and convincing evidence that J.W. is likely to suffer harm in the future from the half-hearted interest her father exhibits towards her. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e), (f) (1988). The only remnant of family for J.W. now lies with her brother, R.W. Siblings should not be separated except for compelling reasons. In the Interest of A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d at 734. We believe it to be in her best interests not to separate these two children.

We further find there is clear and convincing evidence that J.L.W. is unwilling to respond to and comply with services which would correct his situation. For well over two years those conditions set up by the Department of Human Services to unify J.W. with her father were not fulfilled by R.L.W. He has not exhibited any action which would convince us that an additional period of rehabilitation would correct the situation. As stated

previously, J.W. should not be forced to wait endlessly for her father to rise to the responsibility of parenthood. In Interest of T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Iowa 1983).

For these reasons, we reverse that portion of the district court's order declining to terminate J.L.W.'s parental rights, mindful that the Department of Human Services will facilitate joint adoption of J.W. and her brother, R.W.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.