FILED
APR 27 1982
CLERK SUPREME COURT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

ROSE A. BAGLEY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE and CENTURY FLOORS, LTD.,

Respondents-Appellees.

Filed April 27, 1982

2-120
2-67148

Appeal from Polk District Court - Van Wifvat, Judge.

Petitioner appeals from the district court decision on judicial review affirming respondent agency's denial of unemployment benefits, asserting that there was not substantial evidence on the record to support a finding that petitioner voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Linda S. Pettit, Des Moines, for petitioner-appellant.

Joseph L. Bervid, Walter F. Maley, and Blair H. Dewey, Des Moines, for respondents-appellees.

Considered by Donielson, P.J., and Snell, and Carter, JJ.

DONIELSON, J.

Petitioner appeals from the district court decision on judicial review affirming respondent agency's denial of unemployment benefits, asserting that there was not substantial evidence on the record to support a finding that petitioner voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer. We reverse and remand.

I.

Petitioner alleges that she voluntarily quit her job at Century Floors, Ltd. because she was required to do things for her employer which violated her moral and ethical code. For example, on one occasion the employer required her to wipe out a $250.00 credit balance one customer was entitled to for paying the same bill twice and on other occasions she was told to lie to customers over the telephone about deliveries.

Petitioner was initially denied unemployment compensation benefits on June 11, 1980, when a claims deputy found that she "left [her] employment because of dissatisfaction with the work environment." On July 8, 1980, this decision was affirmed on appeal by a hearing officer.[1] The hearing officer cited section 96.5(1), The Code 1979, which provides: "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: if he or she has left his or her work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his or her employer, if so found by the department." The hearing officer then concluded:

> The record fails to sustain that the claimant had good cause within the meaning of the above statute to leave her employment. Her general dissatisfaction with the manner of operation does not provide her with good cause. The excuses which she was expected and asked to relay to

---

[1] The hearing officer's decision and reasoning has been affirmed at every subsequent stage of the appeal. We see no reason to further elaborate the procedural history of this case.

> certain customers, while contrary to her own personal philosophies, were not of such a nature as to require her to subjugate her own principles. A careful examination of the record reveals that the claimant was generally dissatisfied with her working environment and chose to leave the same. This does not provide her with good and substantial reason for leaving her employment.

Our examination of the record reveals that if petitioner's version of the facts is believed there is not substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the agency's conclusion that, "The excuses she was expected and asked to relay to certain customers, while contrary to her own personal philosophies, were not of such a nature as to require her to subjugate her own principles."

We are not prepared to accept the proposition that a "good employee" would find this to be acceptable conduct or that such an act would be a reasonable request by an employer. We agree that some minor excuses or variances from the truth in conduct of the employer's business may not be serious enough to "require her to subjugate her own principles," and that standards with regard to what constitutes "honest" business practices are somewhat flexible. At the same time an employer cannot expect employees to work in an environment totally permeated by falsehoods and deceit. Since we cannot ascertain from the record the extent to which the agency credited petitioner's testimony in deciding this controversy, we reverse the judgment of the district court, vacate the agency decision, and remand the case to the agency for further findings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.