


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA



IN RE MARRIAGE OF SHIRLEY A. EVANS AND DAVID W. EVANS

Upon the Petition of	)	
SHIRLEY A. EVANS,	)	21
Petitioner-Appellee,	)	
And Concerning	)	
DAVID W. EVANS,	)	8-418
Respondent-Appellant.	)	87-633

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn
County (No. DM 14096) - Lynne E. Brady, Judge.

The husband appeals the economic provisions of a
dissolution decree. He contends the wife's child support
obligation is too small and the trial court's division of
the marital property is inequitable. **AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.**

Stephen B. Jackson, Cedar Rapids, for
respondent-appellant.

Eugene J. Kopecky, Cedar Rapids, for
petitioner-appellee.

Considered by Donielson, P.J., and Sackett and Habhab,
JJ.

SACKETT, J.

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Respondent-appellant David W. Evans appeals from his dissolution decree. He contends (1) he should receive additional child support, and (2) the property division was not equitable. We affirm as modified.

This is the dissolution of a twenty-three year marriage. The parties had three children. The youngest is in David's physical care. Shirley was ordered to pay child support of \$40 per week. The other two children were nineteen and twenty-one at the time of trial. They were both post-high school students. The trial court ordered each party to pay one-half their basic college expenses.

I.

David contends the child support for the younger child is not sufficient. We agree. Shirley earns \$33,000 annually; David \$25,000. We increase the child support to \$100 weekly.

II.

David next contends the property division is not equitable. He disagrees with the trial court's valuation of the family home awarded to him. The trial court valued the home at \$65,000. David says it is worth \$60,000. We have reviewed the evidence and find no reason to disturb the valuation.

The trial court divided the property so David would receive about \$71,869.62 in equities and Shirley received

about \$25,626.22. David was then ordered to pay Shirley \$25,626.22 plus the additional amount of \$5,000 to offset David's pension benefits. The trial court placed no value on Shirley's benefits because they were not yet vested.

David objects to the trial court's treatment of the parties' respective pension benefits. He contends his benefits should be set aside to him because he had been contributing to the plan prior to marriage. He also contends the trial court did not properly consider his wife's retirement plan.

Retirement benefits should be considered in framing the financial clause of a dissolution decree. See In re Marriage of Williams, 421 N.W.2d 160, 167 (Iowa App. 1988). We agree with David we should consider both parties' pension rights. In re Marriage of Byall, 353 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa App. 1984). Neither party has provided an accurate valuation of their pension accounts.

The issue is whether David was treated equitably in the economic provisions made by the trial court. In re Marriage of Dahl, 418 N.W.2d 358, 360 (Iowa App. 1987). This is a twenty-three year marriage. David has had the same job throughout. We recognize four of his twenty-seven years retirement benefits were acquired prior to marriage. Shirley worked in a department store when the parties were married. She did child care in her home and cleaned apartments. She has been in her present job for eight

years. Shirley's accrual of seniority, pay increases, social security and pension rights stopped during the years of the marriage. She devoted her efforts primarily to family and home. See In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1974).

Considering all factors, including David's pension and the years of marriage he has paid into social security when Shirley has not, we determine the award is equitable. Dahl, 418 N.W.2d at 360; In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Iowa App. 1982). We affirm the property award.

Each party shall pay his or her own appellate attorney fees. Cost on appeal are taxed one-half to each party.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.