FILED
MAR 26 1985
CLERK SUPREME COURT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOAN M. TRAVIS AND CLYDE T. TRAVIS

Upon the Petition of)
JOAN M. TRAVIS,)
Petitioner-Appellee,)
And Concerning)
CLYDE T. TRAVIS,)
Respondent-Appellant.)

Filed March 26, 1985

5-37
84-704

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County - William L. Thomas, Judge.

Respondent appeals the economic provisions of his dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.

Mary K. Hoefer, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for respondent-appellant.

Stephen B. Jackson, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for petitioner-appellee.

Considered by Donielson, P.J., Snell, and Schlegel, JJ.

SCHLEGEL, J.

Respondent, Clyde Travis, appeals the economic provisions of his dissolution decree. We affirm.

The parties were married in 1954. They have several children, but none were minors at the time of the trial. Joan originally filed a petition for dissolution in October, 1978. Because of some efforts at reconciliation, however, no final decree was entered until December, 1983. Clyde appeals both the property division and the alimony provision of the decree. Our scope of review in this equity action is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4.

I. Property Division. It is apparent from the decree that the trial court tried to divide the marital assets equally. Clyde argues, though, that the trial court erred in calculating the assets to be divided. We find no merit in this argument. The trial court's finding of the value of the parties' house was correct.

We also reject Clyde's argument that the trial court should have decreased the award to Joan because of the debts that he incurred after the separation. While it is true that assets and debts acquired after separation may be considered, In re Marriage of Moffatt, 279 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 1979), a rigid policy of equal division of all property is not statutorily sanctioned. In re Marriage of Wallace, 315 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). Several facts must be considered in dividing the property. See id. (listing factors). The guiding criterion is equity. See Iowa Code § 598.21(1). Under the circumstances of this case, we do not believe it was inequitable to make Clyde solely responsible for the payment of debts which did not benefit Joan.

II. Alimony. The dissolution decree required Clyde to pay $40 per week alimony. Clyde challenges that amount. He points out that at the time of trial his salary averaged $858 per month and Joan's salary was $670 per month. While $40 alimony per week seems a bit much when considering those facts alone, other facts must also be considered.

Clyde is paid on a commission basis, and his earning power can expand if his sales increase. The evidence shows that Clyde is a good salesman and that there is potential for his sales to increase. In fact, his income was higher in the two years preceeding the year of the trial. Joan, however, only works thirty-five hours a week and has little chance for job advancement. Another factor that we consider is that the alimony payments are to end after five years. Based upon these additional circumstances, we affirm the alimony award.

AFFIRMED.