**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA**

FILED
MAR 2 9 2000
CLERK SUPREME COURT

No. 1999-500 (9-757) / 99-0418
Filed March 29, 2000

**IN RE MARRIAGE OF KAREN ANN MONSON AND LAWRENCE THOMAS MONSON**

Upon the Petition of
**KAREN ANN MONSON,**
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
**LAWRENCE THOMAS MONSON,**
Respondent-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Humboldt County, William C. Ostlund, Judge.

Lawrence Monson appeals the property, child support, and alimony provisions of the parties' dissolution decree. **AFFIRMED.**

Joseph J. Straub of Cassel, McMahon, Courtney, Stowater & Straub, Algona, for appellant.

Dan T. McGrevey, Fort Dodge, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Hecht, JJ.

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PER CURIAM

In February 1999 the district court dissolved Larry and Karen Monson's twenty-two-year marriage. Karen was given physical care of the parties' two minor children. In his twenty-four-year term with one employer, Larry had received bonuses in only the last two years. The court did not include bonus income in calculating monthly income. Rather, the court ordered Larry to pay thirty-three or twenty-two percent of any future bonus as child support, depending on whether both or only one child qualified for support. Beginning in mid-2002, after the youngest child reached age eighteen, the court ordered Larry to pay rehabilitative spousal support of $16,000 in at least twenty-four monthly installments. Based on the length of the marriage, the court divided the parties' assets evenly. Larry appeals.

Our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4. Larry first claims the court should not have included his bonus income in determining child support or it should have ordered him to pay a smaller percentage. We find the district court's approach to be equitable in that Larry only pays when he receives a bonus. *See, In re Marriage of Allen*, 493 N.W.2d 273, 275-76 (Iowa App. 1992) (ordering a percentage of any future bonus to be paid as child support). The percentage to be paid approximates the percentage of his net monthly income he is to pay under the guidelines and is equitable.

Larry next contests the court's award of rehabilitative alimony. He argues Karen did not demonstrate she needed training to enter the workplace and that she should have to present "an educational need or plan of action." *See Evans*

*v. Evans*, 559 N.W.2d 240, 248 (S.D. 1997). Iowa law does not require such a showing and we decline to adopt South Dakota's approach. We agree with the district court that Karen "should be given the opportunity to acquire some skills to provider her a comfortable and rewarding work experience." We find the alimony award equitable given the circumstances of the parties before us.

Finally, Larry claims the district court incorrectly valued some vehicles and vehicle parts in dividing the parties' assets. Karen valued the parties' assets at $142,604. Larry valued them at $151,297. The district court's distribution totals $144,486. It is not clear from the record before us exactly which assets the court placed in which categories of its distribution. The value of assets distributed by the court has support in the record. "We give strong deference to the trial court which, after sorting through the economic details of the parties, made a fair division supported by the record." *In re Marriage of Vieth*, 591 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Iowa App. 1999). We affirm the trial court's valuation and distribution of assets.

Karen requests an award appellate attorney fees in the amount of $3,000. An award of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right, but rests within our discretion. We consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the district court's decision on appeal. *Id.* We order Larry to pay $2000 of Karen's appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal taxed to Larry.

**AFFIRMED.**