FILED
AUG 27 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 0-702 / 90-146

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF WILLIAM G. EISCHEN AND PATRICIA L. EISCHEN

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Upon the Petition of

WILLIAM G. EISCHEN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning

PATRICIA L. EISCHEN,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rodney J. Ryan, Judge.

Husband appeals from a dissolution decree, challenging its economic provisions. **AFFIRMED.**

Michael W. O'Malley of Connolly, O'Malley, Lillis, Hansen & Olson, Des Moines, for appellant.

Roger J. Hudson and Michael E. Marshall of Smith, Schneider, Stiles, Mumford, Schrage, Zurek, Wimer & Hudson, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Schlegel, P.J., and Sackett and Habhab, JJ.

PER CURIAM

In this appeal, petitioner-appellant William G. Eischen challenges the economic provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to respondent-appellee Patricia L. Eischen. We affirm.

The parties married in 1985 following a five-year period of cohabitation. At the time of the marriage, William was a physician and Patricia a registered nurse. William received advanced training during the marriage, and Patricia let her nursing certification expire. The parties have no children. Patricia left her employment as a nurse to manage the parties' rental properties.

The trial court allocated the parties' property and debts so that each party received net equities of about $105,000. William was then ordered to pay Patricia alimony of $600 per month for a period of thirty-six months, or until she died or remarried. William also was ordered to pay $3,000 toward Patricia's attorney fees. William challenges the property division, the alimony award, and the provision for payment of attorney fees. We affirm.

We first address William's challenges to the property division and the alimony award. We consider a property division and an alimony award together in evaluating the sufficiency. See In re Marriage of Cooper, 451 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Iowa App. 1989).

We look first at the alimony. In assessing the award, we consider all the criteria enumerated in Iowa Code section 598.21(3). We also consider the applicable case law. See generally In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 66 (Iowa 9189); In re Marriage of Wagner, 434 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Iowa 1988).

While considering all the criteria in section 598.21(3), we look particularly to several factors unique to this case. Alimony is dependent on the unique circumstances of each particular case. Cooper, 451 N.W.2d at 508. Both parties entered the marriage with excellent professions. William has received additional training during the marriage. He currently is employed as an independent contractor by Des Moines General Hospital. He is able to have an annual income, before taxes and after he pays his professional liability insurance, of over $80,000. Patricia has no current earned income. With about thirty hours of education she could become recertified as a registered nurse. If she does become recertified as a nurse, she could, depending on her career choice, have an annual income of up to $35,000.

We have considered the current earning ability and potential of each party. We look to the course their professions took during the marriage. We consider that each party leaves the marriage with substantial property. We consider contributions each has made to the marriage. We affirm the alimony award made by the trial court.

William next challenges the allocation of the property. The trial court made a nearly equal property division. We find it to be equitable and find no reason to disturb it on appeal. See generally In re Marriage of Dahl, 418 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa App. 1987).

The briefs of the parties indicate there may be some confusion as to the division the trial court made of real estate located in Montana, and the division the trial court made of the parties' individual retirement account. We read the trial court's decree to provide that the Montana property be sold and the proceeds be divided evenly between the parties. We read the trial court's decree to give sixty percent of the individual retirement accounts to William and forty percent to Patricia. It is on this basis we have affirmed the trial court.

The trial court awarded Patricia $3,000 to pay her attorney. William contends Patricia has the ability to pay her own attorney, and the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay the $3,000. The trial court has considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees. See generally In re Marriage of Oler, 451 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa App. 1989). William has not shown us the trial court abused its discretion.

AFFIRMED.